Abstract. Well understood methods exist for developing programs from given specifications. A formal method identifies proof obligations at each development step: if all such proof obligations are discharged, a precisely defined class of errors can be excluded from the final program. For a class of "closed" systems such methods offer a gold standard against which less formal approaches can be measured. For "open" systems -those which interact with the physical world-the task of obtaining the program specification can be as challenging as the task of deriving the program. And, when a system of this class must tolerate certain kinds of unreliability in the physical world, it is still more challenging to reach confidence that the specification obtained is adequate. We argue that widening the notion of software development to include specifying the behaviour of the relevant parts of the physical world gives a way to derive the specification of a control system and also to record precisely the assumptions being made about the world outside the computer.
Introduction
A number of methods exist for developing sequential programs from formal specifications (e.g. [9, 1] ). Although such methods are not universally practised, their existence provides a "gold standard" that encourages developers to believe that program design errors can be eliminated. A development method that can scale up to deal with realistic problems must be compositional in the sense that the specification of a sub-system is a complete statement of its required properties. For sequential programs, various forms of pre-/post-condition specifications are adequate. For concurrent programs, the task of finding tractable compositional methods proved more challenging [11] ; but even here, techniques like rely and guarantee specifications (cf. [7, 8, 10, 2] ) provide compositional methods.
If a distinction is made between "closed" and "open" systems -where the former are essentially algorithms in an understood computational domain-it could be said that adequate formal methods are available for closed systems. But the class of "open" systems, which interact with the physical world via sensors and actuators, is both large and very important. Such open systems are often deployed in safety-critical environments. For many of these systems, the task of obtaining a program specification is itself a major challenge. It is to the understanding of this task that the present paper is intended to contribute.
The approach proposed is first to specify the requirements and environment of the overall system; then to capture the assumptions on the physical components by recording rely-conditions; and only then to derive a specification of the computational part of the control system. The developer should resist the temptation to jump in and start specifying the control system from the beginning of a project.
Most open (control) systems must also be designed to tolerate failures in the physical components, both the sensors and actuators and others. Although this need does not change the problem of deriving a specification in any fundamental way, it poses a significant challenge: it is difficult to achieve perspicuity in a specification that addresses the possibility of failures. We address this concern in Section 4. Of course, we make no claim that such systems can be made perfectly safe; we claim only to offer a method that will make it easier to identify the assumptions about the physical components of the system and to ensure that they are formally documented.
Our emphasis on looking first at the external physical environment of a system is advocated in [6, 4, 5] . The original approach to rely/guarantee specifications was not rich enough to cope with continuously varying physical quantities like temperatures, and so we use the notation developed in [12, 13] . Earlier, partial, attacks using some of the ideas presented here include [14] .
This paper presents an attack on a particular illustrative design problem. We do not claim that what follows is a universal method: indeed, it is not enough for some problems and too much for others. But the task of designing a control system for some part of physical reality is a common task, and achieving a dependable system is a challenging goal.
Essentially the idea is to insist that an initial specification be based on a wide view of a system, including both the machine and the problem world. The machine is the computer, executing the control program to be developed. The problem world is that part of physical reality in which the problem resides and in which the effects of the system, once installed and set in operation, will be evaluated. Drawing the boundaries of the problem world demands a judgement based on the responsibilities and the scope of authority of the customer for the system. The customer's responsibilities bound the effects to be evaluated in the problem world, while the scope of authority bounds the freedom of the developers in aiming to achieve those effects.
In general, execution of the control program can not bring about the desired effects directly. They must be brought about indirectly, relying on causal properties of the problem world. We therefore use rely conditions on the problem world in specifying the control system; with corresponding (or stronger) guarantee conditions one can then prove that the parallel composition of the machine with the problem world satisfies the specification of the whole system. The rely conditions remain in the specification as a reminder and a warning: they must be checked for safe deployment. 1 A very simple illustration is a room heating system [12] . We should not jump at once into a specification of the control program, stating what corrective action should follow when the temperature sensor indicates that some limit value has been exceeded. Instead we should first specify the desired relationship between the actual room temperature and the target temperature set on the control knob: this is the requirement. Then we should record, in rely conditions, the properties of the environment: that is, the assumptions we make about the accuracy of the sensors and about the causal chain from activation of the heating equipment to changes in the actual room temperature. Only then are we ready to develop the specification of the control program.
Our ideas are presented using the example of a controller for an irrigation sluice gate. Section 2 begins with the overall requirement for an ideally reliable sluice gate. Section 3 introduces the sensors and motor used to control an ideal sluice gate and develops a specification for a controller for this ideal sluice gate. In Section 4 we consider faults in the problem world, and extend the controller to cope with those faults that it can detect.
The Sluice Gate Problem
The example considered below concerns a sluice gate [5] which controls the flow of water for irrigation purposes. The customer's requirement is that the time when the gate is fully open should be in a certain ratio to time when it is fully closed. This will lead us to a set of assumptions (expressed as rely-conditions) about the behaviour of the motor, sensors etc with which the gate is equipped. To clarify the earlier point about the customer's responsibility and authority, we mention some systems of wider scope that could be tackled. If the requirement were to deliver a certain flow of water, we would have to make assumptions about the available water flow. A yet wider system might be concerned with the growth of crops, leading to assumptions about the weather, plant physiology and the effects of irrigation. A requirement to maximise farm profits would lead to assumptions about a wide range of factors including prices and (in Europe) the Common Agricultural Policy. The example to be addressed here is a system with a far more restricted requirement. Our customer's responsibilities and authority are both bounded by the sluice gate itself and its stipulated operation. The effects of the irrigation schedule on the crops and and the farm profits are firmly outside our scope.
The requirement for our simple problem is that the sluice [3] . In short, the two integrals in the formalisation give the total time in the interval I for which the variable pos is equal to open and closed respectively.
It might be that the customer prefers a looser constraint over each single hour and a constraint closer to "one sixth" over some longer period such as a week: this would allow the pattern of opening to be varied. Similarly, a further requirement might be added specifying that the gate should not be opened or closed more often than three times an hour. Since these possibilities add length to the specification without affecting the basic principles, we do not pursue them here.
The specification of the whole system is to achieve satisfaction of this requirement: SluiceGateSystem = system output pos : Height guarantee SluiceGateRequirement A system 3 specification explicitly lists the observed inputs and outputs of the system, any assumptions about its environment on which it relies, and the condition it guarantees to establish. In this case there are no assumptions and there are no inputs: the overall specification is concerned only with the gate position, which is an output.
Introducing the Controller
There is, of course, a question -even within the agreed boundaries-of which system is being designed here. In some applications the designer might have the luxury of starting from scratch and choosing the equipment, including the placing of sensors etc. Here we assume that all the equipment is already in place in the problem world, and must be treated as given. Figure 1 shows the machine (the computer executing the control program that we are developing), the problem world (the gate with its sensors and drive motor), and the requirement. The observable phenomena of the requirement are represented by the arrow marked a, and the interface of shared phenomena by which the Control machine monitors and controls the Gate-Sensor-Motor (GSM) problem world is represented by the line marked b.
Control
Requirement GSM a b The requirement (which in the preceding section was called SluiceGateRequirement) is concerned only with pos a : {pos : Height} which is determined by the behaviour of GSM. At interface b, GSM also sets the sensors top and bot, but the Control machine can set the direction control dir = up or dir = down, and switch the motor by setting motor = on or motor = of f :
We might have decomposed GSM into separate gate, sensor and motor components. We have not done so here because it is simpler, and adequate for our purposes, to describe the GSM subsystem as a whole.
Specifying the Controller
The immediate objective is to arrive at a specification of the control system. It would obviously be possible to observe that Control||GSM must satisfy the specification of the Sluice Gate System and jump straight to an outline algorithm which indicated that the control system should open the sluice gate; pause 8 minutes; then move the gate down; pause for about 48 minutes; etc. Any temptation to specify the control system in this way should be resisted. The aim here is to derive an implicit specification of the control system from an understanding of the components. This identifies the assumptions clearly but the full payoff of this approach is apparent when faults are considered in Section 4.
The Control machine's inputs are the states of the sensors; its outputs are the motor controls. It relies on the sensors and the motor working correctly, and must guarantee that the required behaviour of the sluice gate is achieved, while not invalidating any assumptions about how the GSM subsystem must be operated.
The states of the two sensors, top and bot, can be formalised as boolean functions of time
top, bot : boolean
When functioning properly, they detect when the gate is fully open (top) or fully closed (bot). We formalise this notion in the following definition. A timed predicate of the form P over I states that the predicate P holds for every instant of time in the interval I. In the definition, T is the complete time interval over which the system operates.
SensorP rop = (((pos = open) ⇔ top) ∧ ((pos = closed) ⇔ bot)) over T

This is equivalent to ∀t : T @((pos(t) = open) ⇔ top(t)) ∧ ((pos(t) = closed) ⇔ bot(t)).
The sluice gate is driven by a motor that turns a screw thread that raises or lowers the gate. At the interface b the Control machine can switch the motor on or off, and can set the direction in which it drives the gate. If the motor has been on in the direction up for at least some constant uptime, the gate will have reached the open position and will remain there after the motor is turned off. A similar condition applies for the downward travel. First, we formalise the motor control and direction states, and define the constants uptime and downtime motor : on|of f direction : up|down uptime = 1 min downtime = 1 min Next, we formalise the definition of the motor's effect on the gate. In the definition, an interval I adjoins an interval J, written I adjoins J, if the supremum of I is equal to the infimum of J, i.e., sup I = inf J:
The task of the controller is to achieve the SluiceGateRequirement on the assumption that it can rely on the properties of the sensor and the motor. Although pos is not a direct input or output of the controller (see Figure 1 and the accompanying descriptions of a and b), we allow the controller specification below to reference pos as an 'external' variable. This allows the specification to incorporate the original requirement directly. 
The Breakage Concern
At first sight it seems that our specification, though unrefined, is complete so far as it goes. But it is not: we must first address several standard concerns. Here we will address only the breakage concern of [5] . In a control problem such as we are discussing here, it is necessary to ensure that the machine itself does not cause failure of any component of the problem domain by ignoring known restrictions on its use. For example, checking the motor equipment manual we learn that the motor will be damaged if it is switched between directions without being brought to rest in between. Between any two periods in which the motor is on and running in opposite directions there must therefore be a period in which it is switched off; and this period must not be less than the motor's shut down time, motor shutdown.
A second restriction applies when the motor has driven the gate to the open or shut position. It must then be switched off soon enough to avoid straining the motor and mechanism when the gate reaches the end of its vertical travel and further movement is impossible. motor limit is the time within which the motor must be switched off once the gate has reached the open or closed position.
We formalise both restrictions in the definition M otorRestrictions. In this definition, an interval I precedes an interval J, written I precedes J, if the supremum of I is less than or equal to the infimum of J.
Only if it respects the M otorRestrictions can the Control machine rely on the behaviour described in M otorOperation. Thus, the specification for the controller (still assuming fault-free sensors) is now 
Removing the External Reference
References to the external variable pos must be eliminated from the controller specification before deriving an implementation. For our simple example this is straightforward because the assumption SensorP rop gives a way to rewrite the references to pos in terms of top and bot. For example, the revised sluice gate requirement becomes
M otorRestrictions and M otorOperation can be revised in the same manner to give M otorRestrictions2 and M otorOperation2 respectively. Because the controller specification can rely on SensorP rop, rewriting it to use the revised predicates gives a specification that is formally equivalent 5 .
The assumption SensorP rop has now fulfilled its purpose, and can be removed to give a refined specification. Further, because pos is no longer referenced in the specification, its declaration can be removed. This gives the following refined specification. 
Controller2
Detecting Domain Faults
The specification Controller2 is idealised in the sense that all of the components in the problem world are assumed to function faultlessly. In a critical system -or any system in which it is important to limit the possible damage to the equipment-this assumption must be questioned. Potential faults must be identified and the software must deal with them appropriately. In [5] this obligation is called the reliability concern. If a faulty component is detected, the Control machine must switch off the motor and turn on an alarm to indicate that the system needs attention from the maintenance engineer and that the irrigation requirement is no longer being satisfied.
Domain Faults
In the present section we are concerned only with the analysis of domain faults and with formalising their detection. We address the composition of this requirement with the SluiceGateRequirement in the next section. We start in the problem domain, and identify observable faults that can arise in the domain. Our analysis uncovers potential faults like these (but not only these): -A log becomes jammed under the gate.
-A sensor develops an open circuit fault (fails false).
-A sensor develops a short circuit fault (fails true). -The screw mechanism becomes rusty and the gate jams.
-The screw mechanism breaks, allowing the gate to slide freely. -The direction control cable is cut.
-The motor efficiency is reduced by deterioration of the bearings. -The motor overheats.
We then consider how these faults in the problem domain can be detected by the Control machine at its interface b with the domain (see Figure 1 ). Because this interface is very simple, and consists only of the states of the top and bot sensors and the motor settings, it is clear that the Control machine can not distinguish between different faults in the domain. For example, it can not distinguish between a log jammed under the gate and an open-circuit bot sensor: both manifest themselves by failure of the bot sensor to indicate arrival of the gate at the closed position in spite of the motor having been set on and down for at least downtime. In a safety-critical system we would consider improving the interface by adding new sensors. For example, we might add a sensor to detect motor temperature or motor speed; or we might provide a finer grain of sensing of the vertical position of the gate. For the purposes of this example, we add an additional Boolean sensor, motor too hot, that indicates the motor temperature is excessive. An interesting aspect of this fault is that the phenomena used to describe the fault are not part of the description of the ideal behaviour of the sluice gate.
The faulty state, F aulty GSM , can be detected by the occurrence of any of these (informally expressed) conditions:
-The top sensor does not become true when it should.
-The bot sensor does not become true when it should.
-The bot sensor does not become false when it should (when the motor has been set on and up for a duration of at least rise start time). -The top sensor does not become false when it should (when the motor has been set on and down for a duration of at least fall start time). -The top sensor becomes true earlier than it should (when the motor has been set on and up). -The bot sensor becomes true earlier than it should (when the motor has been set on and down). -The top sensor changes value while the motor is set off.
-The bot sensor changes value while the motor is set off.
-top and bot are simultaneously true at any time.
-The motor too hot sensor becomes true.
For brevity we will not present the full formalisation of F aulty GSM . Given suitable declarations of duration constants for the criteria of fault-free operation in the domain we obtain a definition of the faulty state. Recognition of the state is triggered by an interval J in which a fault condition is detected.
((top ∧ bot) over J)∨ ((motor too hot) over J)
We must now discharge the obligation to show that F aulty GSM holds whenever a fault is present in the domain for which we require the Control machine to switch off the motor and turn on the alarm. We leave this as an exercise for the energetic reader who has completed the definition of F aulty GSM .
Composing the Requirements
Our intention is to compose both requirements (irrigation and fault tolerance) in the one Control machine. We must therefore elaborate the interface b of Figure 1 to include the setting of the alarm and the temperature sensor. Modifying the annotation given in Section 3 we have:
First we must elaborate our existing Control machine, specifying that during its execution the alarm is off. The elaborated machine is Controller3:
Two systems may be conjoined: the inputs and outputs of the conjoined system are the unions of the inputs and outputs respectively of the two systems (common inputs and outputs must have the same type), and the rely and guarantee conditions are the conjunctions of their rely and guarantee conditions respectively. So the specification Controller2 ∧ AlarmOf f specifies a system that is the same as Controller2 but has an additional output alarm that is always off.
The behaviour required when a domain fault has been detected is to switch the motor off and the alarm on within some permitted response time f ault response:
The required behaviour for raising the alarm can be simply defined. Note that it requires the restrictions on controlling the motor to be maintained.
Raise Alarm = system input top, bot : boolean input motor too hot : boolean output motor : on|of f output direction : up|down output alarm : on|of f guarantee M otorRestrictions2 ∧ AlarmSet Finally, we must specify the combination of Controller3 and Raise Alarm in response to faults. For this we need to consider two modes of fault detection: -faults that persist over a long enough interval of time that we insist they are detected; and -faults that exist for only a short period of time that may or may not be detected.
We introduce two separate (but similar) operators to allow these two different modes of fault detection to be specified. For systems S1 and S2 and a predicate C that takes a time interval as a parameter (like F aulty GSM ) -a hard fault obliges the system to take notice S1 until C requires S2 and -a "transient" fault allows the system to take notice S1 until C allows S2 For example, Controller4 =Controller3 until F aulty GSM allows Raise Alarm describes a system that operates as an ideal controller, but may raise the alarm if there is a fault, and Controller5 =Controller4 until Hard F ault GSM requires Raise Alarm describes a system that must raise the alarm as soon as a hard fault appears, where
We describe the semantics of these two combinators, starting with the more liberal second combinator because it is slightly simpler. S1 until C allows S2 either behaves like S1, or if there exists an interval J over which C(J) holds, it may (is allowed to) behave like S1 until the start of the interval J, and then behave like S2 from that time on. To describe the combinator more formally, we use the term behaviour to refer to a trace of the values of the variables over time, and the function behaviours(S, T ) gives the set of all possible behaviours of system S over the time interval T . The boolean term C(J)(b) states that the predicate C(J) holds for the behaviour b.
The operator "I ¡ b1" takes a timed trace behaviour b1 and restricts it to a trace whose domain is contained in the interval I. The catenation of two traces, b c assumes that the domain of b has an end time equal to the start time of the domain of c and that the values of the variables at the end of trace b are equal to the values of the variables at the beginning of trace c; the resultant trace is then the union of the two traces.
The semantics of the obligatory exception mechanism is similar but it requires that there is no earlier occurrence of the condition C. The first alternative allows for the case where there is no interval over which C holds.
Further Work
This paper illustrates what the authors hope will become a method for handling a class of developments. However, much remains to be done to establish the scope of this method and to refine its details. In this section we consider some avenues for further work.
On the Sluice Gate Application
The Sluice Gate problem has proved very stimulating and we have tried to expose the issues it has thrown up rather than modify the problem to fit our evolving method. For example, the second author has on occasions played the role of our customer and has consistently refused requests to acquire new sensors to simplify formulations. There are, of course, a variety of other (dependability) issues which could be considered; examples include: -the power supply to the motor; -the hardware signals levels used for motor and dir; -the maximum load of the motor; -the maximum start up time under any load less than the maximum; -the running state revolutions per minute.
While we believe that such points do not bring in fundamentally different technical requirements, they should be categorised as an indication that nothing has been hidden.
More General Points
The aim to separate the treatment of errors from the behaviour required in an (unrealistically) ideal environment has caused us considerable difficulty. We have experimented with an asymmetric otherwise operator, ways of combining traces of descriptions which permit non-determinism, and only late on accepted the allows/requires distinction. The need to say that the presence of one condition overrides others appears to force an asymmetric operator and the (Deontic) distinction is at least plausible. Whether there is a smaller set of primitive concepts in terms of which these ideas can be expressed is the subject of further work.
Many open (real-time) systems appear to operate cyclicly. Indeed, even the sluice gate could be viewed as operating on an hourly cycle (possibly embedded in a larger cycle between, say, maintenance periods). The authors are not aware of any (temporal) notations that offer clear ways of indicating such cyclic behaviour.
It would be useful to have more systematic ways of looking for fault situations. If one followed [5] and constructed a model of the gate within the Control system, this would -for example-offer a notion within the Controller of the expected height of the gate. This, in turn, would facilitate expression of a rely condition to show the degree of expected drift/conformance. We have only made tentative experiments with this idea so far.
One of the refrees raised the interesting point of the "evolvability" of a system. The authors agree that this is an important issue; evolution is in fact a major strand of work within the Dependability IRC. A study of the contribution of other research on "evolvability" to the issues of this paper will be undertaken in the future.
Conclusions
The starting point for the specification of a control system is a specification of the desired behaviour of the controlled system, e.g., the sluice gate position, given independently of the (physical) mechanisms used to implement the (physical) control. As indicated earlier, there are different possible models of the system that allow different aspects of the system to be specified. Choice of an appropriate model comes down to the customer's choice of requirements. The model must be rich enough to allow the requirements to be specified, but not so rich that the specification is unnecessarily complex.
Having specified the overall requirements, we must detail the properties of the given (physical) components (e.g., the sensors and motor). These are the properties the controller can rely on to achieve the desired goal. In addition, the components may have restrictions on the way in which they may be operated without risk of breakage. The controller must ensure that it conforms to these requirements too.
In specifying the requirements and the properties of the components it is in general necessary to make use of models of parts of the system that are not directly interfaced to the machine (for example, the external variable pos in the controller specification does not appear in the interface between the machine and the problem world). This necessity springs from two sources. First, the customer's interest is not, in general, restricted to phenomena at the interface: the Sluice Gate customer cares whether the gate is open or closed, not about the sensor states. Second, if we fail to distinguish phenomena at the interface from those that lie deeper in the problem world, we can not address the reliability concern: it arises precisely from that distinction. It is then a central goal of the process of refining the controller specification to rephrase its required behaviour solely in terms of its interface to the problem world.
A further technique we used to structure the controller specification is to separate the Control requirement when the problem domain is behaving faultlessly from the requirement in the presence of faults. It is first worthwhile to examine possible faults in the overall system. These may involve phenoma that are not part of the description of the idealised machine. Next one must consider the class of faults that can be phrased purely in terms of the system's interface to the environment. The utility of the machine's response to problem world failures is limited by the richness of the interface between them. A richer interface allows better diagnosis of faults and more specific responses. However, introducing richer interfaces has two consequences: first, they may be more prone to failure than the simple interface; and second, they make the control software itself more complicated and hence more prone to software error.
Our building blocks for specifications are systems specified in terms of their inputs, outputs and external variables as well as the assumptions about the inputs that they rely upon and the goals that they guarantee to achieve. To build more complex specifications one could continue to use systems specified in the same way, but with more complex rely and guarantee conditions. Alternatively, as we have done here, one can provide operators such as conjunction and until-requires to combine system specifications. Logically both approaches are equivalent; the choice between them is more one of ease of presentation and understandability of the resulting specification. A structured specification built from component systems can be flattened to a simple system specification with rely and guarantee conditions.
